Does public interest prevail over the right to erasure?

Does public interest prevail over the right to erasure?

With the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018, the so-called “the right to erasure” was consolidated. This right is understood as the ability of any individual, under certain circumstances, to request that links leading to their personal data be removed from the results displayed when their name is searched on the Internet.

However, this right is not absolute and may come into conflict with other rights of constitutional rank, such as freedom of expression (which protects the dissemination of ideas, value judgments, and opinions) and the right to information, which guarantees citizens’ access to truthful, relevant, and publicly significant information. The removal of links, although legitimate in certain cases, may distort the narrative of relevant events by allowing someone to dissociate themselves from circumstances in which they were involved and which form part of the collective memory.

For this reason, courts have emphasized that these rights must be weighed on a case-by-case basis. The right to data protection gives way where public figures or events of social significance are concerned. This reasoning is reflected, among others, in Supreme Court Judgment (STS) 1401/2024, of 4 March, and National High Court Judgment (SAN) 1211/2024, of 6 February, both of which denied the application of the right to erasure on the grounds that dissemination of the information served an overriding public interest.

Public interest and freedom of information

A key precedent is Supreme Court Judgment 1175/2020, of 17 September, which held that freedom of information prevails over data protection whenever the facts disclosed are of public relevance.

The ruling drew a distinction between:

• Information related to the professional sphere, which may be of public interest, and information concerning the private sphere, which warrants greater protection.
• Content that, although true, is disproportionate or irrelevant, in which case privacy protection should prevail.
• Moreover, the Supreme Court stressed the need to differentiate between freedom of information (fact-based reporting) and freedom of expression (opinions or value judgments). The former carries greater legal weight when balanced against the right to privacy or data protection.

The relationship between online reputation and the right to erasure

In today’s digital environment, online reputation has become a central element of both personal and professional identity. The information that appears when a person’s name is entered into a search engine may significantly influence their public image, career prospects, and social relationships. The right to erasure therefore serves as a mechanism to safeguard reputation, enabling outdated, inaccurate, or irrelevant information to no longer be directly associated with an individual’s name.

That said, the exercise of this right does not entail the erasure of information from the Internet, but rather restricts its accessibility when searches are conducted specifically by name. The material remains available at its original source, thus ensuring the preservation of collective memory and continued public access to information through alternative means.

The real challenge lies in ensuring that the right to erasure is not misused as a tool to rewrite history or construct artificially “clean” reputations. The de-indexing of search results is legitimate when it shields private life from obsolete or irrelevant information, but it cannot serve as a shield against the disclosure of truthful facts that are essential for accountability of public officials or persons engaged in matters of social relevance.

The right to erasure on Google

The most emblematic case is the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgment of 13 May 2014 (Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Mario Costeja), which recognized that individuals may require search engines to remove results linked to their name where the information is outdated, harmful, or lacks current relevance. The CJEU held that this right prevails, in principle, over the economic interests of the search engine operator and, in certain circumstances, also over the public’s interest in accessing such information.

Nonetheless, case law makes clear that the right is not unlimited: any decision must take into account factors such as the passage of time, the nature and sensitivity of the data (particularly if it involves specially protected information such as ideology, religion, or sexual orientation), and the public role or notoriety of the data subject.

In sum, the right to erasure and digital reputation are closely intertwined, yet their application requires a careful balance between privacy and public interest. Rather than erasing the past, the right to erasure seeks to ensure that available information is relevant, proportionate and up to date, without undermining transparency, freedom of information, or collective memory.